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led pro-Yeltsin demonstrations in Chechnya. 2 In their many interactions with each other, both Yeltsin and Dudayev displayed dogged 3 determination and a fondness for power. They continued to exercise these traits in the coming military confrontation.
In formulating a strategy for dealing with Chechnya, Yeltsin made several assumptions about the international and domestic environments. Prior to his decision to resort to military action, he made the broad assumption that forcing Chechnya back into the Russian fold would not result in intervention by the international community. While he could expect official hand wringing and expressions of concern from the United States, the risk of further action was low.
He had learned from the Afghanistan experience that American resolve had its limits. The
United States was even less likely to help Chechnya gain its independence that it had been to support the Afghan rebels. He correctly assumed the United States would view the Chechen problem as an internal one, a case of civil war that Russia should resolve on its own. Chechnya's strategic location at the juncture of several major oil and gas pipelines, as well as its Chechens used a cleverly disguised network of centric warfare to confuse the Russians. Slowly the Russians realized that they were facing a decentralized but organized attack. By the time they reached Grozny, the Russians knew they could not break the Chechen will with a simple demonstration of firepower. Taking Grozny would require brute force and a protracted battle.
During the battle for Grozny, small groups of Chechens developed the practice of "hugging" Russian units using hunter-killer tactics. This effort proved extremely effective and resulted in significant Russian losses. More importantly, these unrelenting non-linear assaults broke down the will of the Russian conscripts. What they viewed initially as a quick march to the center of gravity in Grozny had evolved into a lengthy conflict against a determined foe. The Chechens demonstrated much more aptitude for strategic information and psychological warfare than the Russians. 18 They displayed a high level of sophistication by gaining the support of NGOs to plead their case in the court of public opinion. This effort not only gained international attention but also struck at the heart of Russian popular support.
Although both sides used brutality as a psychological weapon, the Chechens raised it to a grisly art form. By decapitating dead Russian soldiers and booby-trapping their bodies, they In evaluating the costs of the conflict, it is important to note that Russia views battlefield casualties differently from many of its Western counterparts. Though militarily beaten, Russia's ability to absorb casualties had a strategic impact on its war with Chechnya. Russia decided to pay the price of high military casualties to achieve its political goal of keeping Chechnya in the Russian Federation. The Chechens found the price of freedom excessive and deferred the autonomy issue. As a result, the Russians won the strategic battle, gaining time to regroup, study the war, and prepare for the next test of Chechen will. 
CONCLUSIONS

